Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant Laura Carsner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Appellant shot her mother and stepfather after a family dispute concerning visitation with appellant's minor daughter. The court of appeals held that she was entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After its review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the court of appeals neglected to analyze two prongsof the applicable four-pronged test and to address the State’s arguments regarding those prongs. Consequently, it vacated the court of appeals’ decision and remand the case to that court for further consideration. View "Carsner v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals granted the State Prosecuting Attorney’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred when it held that there was insufficient evidence to sustain Appellant Clister Ray Thomas' conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. Appellant was required to as a sex offender due to a 1987 conviction for aggravated sexual assault. Appellant registered his address, 1900 South Green Street, Apartment 210, with the Longview Police Department, the local law-enforcement agency responsible for sex-offender registration. That apartment was leased by the daughter of Appellant’s girlfriend, but Appellant and his girlfriend stayed at the apartment “off and on.” Officer Jeff Hall of the Longview Police Department contacted the property manager of the apartment complex to ask if she was aware that Appellant (as a registered sex offender) was living on the premises. The manager told Hall that she was not aware of that, and she subsequently called the Longview Police Department to ask officers to issue a criminal-trespass warning to Appellant. When the officers arrived, the manager, Appellant’s girlfriend, and her daughter were present. At that time, the manager told the daughter that she would be evicted if Appellant continued to reside with her and her mother. Ultimately, the officers issued Appellant a criminal-trespass warning and arrested him on other outstanding warrants. When Appellant was booked into the county jail, he told officers that he lived at a different address, 1703 Houston Street. After reviewing the evidence in this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the appellate court, finding sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The case was remanded for consideration of whether Appellant was harmed by any error in the jury charge. View "Ray v. Texas" on Justia Law

Elisa Wilson was convicted of telephone-harassment conviction. On appeal, she claimed that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that she made repeated telephone communications in a manner reasonably likely to annoy or alarm another. The court of appeals acquitted Wilson, finding that Wilson’s calls were neither repeated nor reasonably likely to harass or annoy. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that: (1) the phrase “repeated telephone communications” did not require the communications to occur within a certain time frame in relation to one another; and (2) a facially legitimate reason for the communication did not negate per se an element of the statute. View "Wilson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with twenty-six counts of improper photography or visual recording. Each count of the indictment alleged appellant, “with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of THE DEFENDANT, did by electronic means record another . . . at a location that was not a bathroom or private dressing room.” Each count further specified the name of an “.avi” file that was recorded. Some of the counts contained additional information regarding the subject matter and location of the recording. Appellant filed a pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he alleged that the statute on which his prosecution was based was facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. The trial court denied the application, and appellant appealed. The “improper photography or visual recording” statute makes it a crime to, among other things, photograph or record by electronic means a visual image of another person under certain circumstances. Subsection (b)(1) of the statute makes such acts a crime if: (1) the person being photographed or recorded is not in a bathroom or private dressing room; (2) the photograph or recording of the person is made without that person’s consent; and (3) the photograph or recording is made with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that, to the extent that it proscribed taking photographs and recording visual images, Subsection (b)(1) of the statute was facially unconstitutional in violation of the freedom of speech guarantee of the First Amendment. Consequently, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Thompson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Applicant of capital murder for the death of a four-year-old child she and her husband were in the process of adopting. The trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment without parole. Her conviction and sentence were upheld by the court of appeals and the Court of Criminal Appeals refused her petition for discretionary review. Applicant filed an article 11.07 application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that she was actually innocent based upon newly discovered evidence, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. A hearing was ordered, a habeas judge conducted the hearing and entered findings of facts and conclusions of law, ultimately recommending that relief be denied. The Court of Criminal Appeals ordered the application be filed and set for submission to determine whether: (1) Applicant received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Because the Court concluded that Applicant did receive ineffective assistance of counsel, relief was granted. View "In re Overton" on Justia Law

Appellant Roman Ramirez-Memije was charged with fraudulent possession of identifying information under Texas Penal Code Section 32.51(b). A jury found him guilty and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary conduct under Section 6.01 and on presumptions under Section 2.05 of the Penal Code, and erred in admitting testimony that he was from Mexico and was working illegally in the United States. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review to address whether defendant was entitled to an instruction on voluntary possession when he claimed he did not know the forbidden nature of the thing he possessed, or was his defense merely a negation of his knowledge of surrounding circumstances that is required by Section 6.03(b). The Court held that Appellant was not entitled to the requested instruction, and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Appellant’s remaining issues. View "Ramirez-Memije v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Stephanie Bekendam was convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to 20 years in prison and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine. She appealed, arguing the trial court erred in admitting the expert testimony of the Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) forensic scientist who tested the blood sample and issued the toxicology report. The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, appellant argued that the court of appeals incorrectly applied the law for admissibility of expert testimony, misconstrued Rule of Evidence 702, and decided an important question of law that had not been settled. The State filed a cross-petition, claiming that the court of appeals failed to address its argument that Appellant’s error was not preserved for review. The Court of Criminal Appeal found no reversible error, overruled the State's ground and affirmed the court of appeals' decision. View "Bekendam v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant, owner of a condominium unit, carried a handgun in the common area of the condominium complex. The issue before the Court of Criminal Appeal in this matter centered on whether appellant violated the “unlawful carrying weapons” (UCW) statute. Generally, the statute prohibits carrying of a handgun except on "the person's own premises." The issue specifically in this case was whether the common area to the condominium complex was part of appellants' "own premises." The Court of Criminal Appeals held that appellant did not violate the UCW statute, and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Chiarini v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jose Angel Bedolla was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and leaving the scene of an accident involving injury. The jury sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for the aggravated assault and a five year probated sentence and $5,000 fine for leaving the scene. Appellant appealed the trial court’s failure to include a self-defense instruction in the jury charge. The court of appeals held that the issue was not preserved for review. The issue this case presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the appellate court erred in holding that Appellant failed to preserve his complaint regarding the trial court’s refusal to submit a self-defense with deadly-force instruction because uncharged contemporaneous conduct could have given rise to a self-defense instruction. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with appellant's contention and reversed the court of appeals. The case was remanded for consideration of the merits of Appellant’s arguments on appeal. View "Bedolla v. Texas" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to engaging in organized criminal activity on the advice of his retained trial counsel, appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging a conflict of interest on counsel’s part. At the trial court’s hearing on the motion, trial counsel, accused of having misappropriated certain funds entrusted to him by his client, invoked his Fifth Amendment right to refuse “to be a witness against himself.” In response, appellant argued to the trial court that “[a]n inference can be taken from that” that trial counsel had misappropriated the funds. The trial court declined to adopt that inference and denied the motion. The court of appeals, noting in its opinion that the entirety of the evidence offered by the appellant in support of his motion for new trial was “uncontroverted due to [trial counsel]’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself,” held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the motion. It reversed the trial court’s judgment (effectively vacating the appellant’s conviction) and remanded the matter back to that court for a new trial. The State petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review of the court of appeals’ opinion. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that trial court did not abuse its discretion “in denying appellant’s new-trial motion on the ground that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest,” and the court of appeals erred to conclude otherwise. The judgment of the court of appeals was therefore reversed. Because the court of appeals sustained the appellant’s first and second issues on appeal, it did not reach the appellant’s “third and fourth issues, in which he argue[d] that the trial court erred in denying his new-trial motion on the ground that his trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.” Accordingly, the case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of remaining issues “necessary to the final disposition” of the appellant’s appeal of conviction. View "Odelugo v. Texas" on Justia Law