Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Darrell David was indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. David failed to appear at a trial setting, and a judgment nisi was entered for the forfeiture of a $10,000 bond. A final judgment of forfeiture was signed, forfeiting the bond and requiring the payment of $100 interest, $396 in court costs, and any reasonable and necessary costs incurred by the county for the return of the criminal defendant. The surety (Continental Heritage) filed a motion to correct costs. The motion contended the collection of civil filing fees was not authorized in bond forfeiture proceedings, identifying specific fees it claimed it should not have to pay, which were most of the fees in the bill of costs. The motion contended that authority to dispute costs was conferred by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.008. The parties litigated the issue before the trial court. The State took the position that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revise costs under Article 103.008 and also argued that the costs were legitimate. The surety took the position that the trial court had jurisdiction to address the costs and that it should have to pay only some of the court costs, which the surety believed totaled $94. The trial court ruled that it had jurisdiction to address the issue of court costs, but it denied the surety’s motion to revise the costs. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a surety can be liable—and is generally liable—for civil filing fees as court costs in a bond-forfeiture action when the State prevails. "But the surety is not liable for a filing fee that the State is entirely exempt from paying unless a statute nevertheless requires a civil defendant to pay the fee if the State prevails. The surety also cannot be required to pay a fee that improperly duplicates a fee already charged." The Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Continental Heritage Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Noel Huggins pled pro se guilty to possession of methamphetamine and was sentenced by the trial court to 18 years in prison. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeal granted review to decide whether his right to counsel was violated. Appellant’s state-jail, possession charge was enhanced with two prior felonies. Appellant doubted the validity of the enhancement allegations, and that doubt helped fuel his on-again/off-again self-representation. He represented himself at the beginning and the end of his case, but he was otherwise represented by two attorneys appointed in succession during most of the approximately 22 months that his case was pending in the trial court. After his trial date was reached during his second period of self- representation and while a venire was standing by, he announced that he would plead guilty and asked for representation again, but the trial court refused to appoint a third attorney. Appellant argued that his two waivers of counsel were not made knowingly and intelligently because the trial court did not admonish him about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and the trial court denied him his statutory right to withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 1.051(h). The court of appeals said the trial court was not required to admonish Appellant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation because he did not contest his guilt. The court then looked at whether Appellant’s waiver of counsel was intelligent, knowing, and voluntary. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court of appeals concluded that it was. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Appellant's right to counsel was not violated. View "Huggins v. Texas" on Justia Law

In an application for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, Applicant Danny Lane challenged his 2007 conviction for failing to comply with sex-offender-registration requirements on five grounds: (1) actual innocence; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) involuntary plea; (4) due process violation; and (5) no evidence. Though Applicant raised several grounds for relief, the underlying basis for all of his claims was the same: that, unbeknownst to him at the time of his guilty plea, he was not actually required to register as a sex offender because, although he was convicted of aggravated rape in 1982, that conviction was later “set aside” by the convicting court upon his successful completion of probation through a “judicial clemency” order. In support of his position, Applicant relied on a decision from the Sixth Court of Appeals, issued after his guilty plea in this case, interpreting the relevant statutes to mean that a similarly situated individual had no duty to register and thus could not be guilty of failing to register as a sex offender. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the habeas court's recommendation to grant relief based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel resulting in an involuntary plea, or under a theory of actual innocence / no evidence. The Court concluded that the law was unsettled as to whether Applicant had a duty to register as a sex offender following the trial court’s grant of judicial clemency. Thus, trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to further investigate that issue when further investigation would not have yielded any clear answer under the law. The Court concluded the governing statutes in Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 62 meant that Applicant’s 1982 aggravated rape conviction obligated him to register as a sex offender, notwithstanding the trial court’s order granting him judicial clemency under former Code of Criminal Procedure Article 42.12, Section 7. Relief was denied on all claims. View "Ex parte Danny Lane" on Justia Law

In 1998, applicant Rodney Reed was convicted by jury of the capital murder of nineteen-year-old Stacey Lee Stites. The indictment alleged that in April 1996, Reed strangled Stacey to death in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault. In the years that followed, continuing through this proceeding, Reed has made multiple efforts to have his capital murder conviction overturned. He primarily advanced the theory that he was innocent of Stacey’s murder —specifically, that the biological evidence linking him to Stacey’s body was deposited there because he and Stacey were in a consensual sexual relationship and that Stacey was actually killed by her jealous and domineering fiance, Jimmy Fennell. After review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found Reed's latest attempts to overturn his conviction failed under Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), and procedurally under Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Ultimately, the Court denied relief and dismissed any remaining claims as abuses of the writ. View "Ex parte Rodney Reed" on Justia Law

On April 19, 2018 in Forth Worth, Appellant Terry King assaulted a twelve-year-old girl who was on her way to the school bus. At all times relevant to this case, Appellant was working as a truck driver, operating a semi-tractor trailor (hereinafter, “truck”) owned by his employer, John Feltman. Due to the nature of his work as a long-haul truck driver, Appellant lived out of the truck while working on the road. In July 2018, Appellant was arrested in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma near the truck he drove. On the same day, the Oklahoma police searched the truck pursuant to a warrant. During the search, detectives found Appellant’s cell phone and intended to seize it, but inadvertently left the cell phone in the truck. The gathered evidence, minus the cell phone, was transported to the Fort Worth Police Department. Upon realizing the cell phone was missing, Fort Worth Police Detective Pat Henz contacted the truck owner, Feltman, and asked him to retrieve the phone and send it to the police department. Upon receipt on August 9, 2018, a search warrant for the contents of the cell phone was issued and executed. Child pornography was found on the cell phone. The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether an employee retained standing to contest a search or seizure in his work vehicle several days after he was arrested and after the vehicle was returned to his employer. To this, the Court responded "possibly." But based on the facts of this case, the Court found Appellant did not meet his burden to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy as would confer standing. View "King v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2017, after Maria Delcarman Sosa-Esparza was indicted for a felony offense, she entered into a bail bond agreement with Appellant Maxie Green, doing business as A to Z Bail Bonds. Appellant paid a $25,000 bond so that Sosa-Esparza could be released from jail. A condition of the trial court in setting a bond amount was an assurance that Sosa-Esparza would appear for all of her court settings. But on March 1, 2019, Sosa-Esparza failed to appear for her pretrial conference. The trial court then signed a judgment nisi that provisionally forfeited the $25,000 bond. The judgment nisi stated that Sosa-Esparza’s name was “distinctly called at the courtroom door. Defendant was given reasonable time to appear after her name was called, but she did not appear.” The judgment nisi also provided that the judgment would be made final unless good cause could be shown for why Sosa-Esparza failed to appear. Appellant argued, among other things, that because the judgment nisi stated that the defendant’s name was called at the courtROOM door, the State’s evidence failed to conclusively establish that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether her name was properly called at the courtHOUSE door. (emphasis added). The issue this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether, for purposes of summary judgment in a bond forfeiture case, providing conclusive proof that the name of the defendant on bond was distinctly called at the door of the courtROOM establishes the element that “[t]he name of the defendant shall be called distinctly at the courthouse door[.]” To this, the Court held that it did: "This holding is founded on well-established precedent from this Court and the courts of appeals recognizing that calling the defendant’s name at the courtroom door constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22.02." View "Green v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Kevin Sheffield couldn't make bond and was placed into custody August 2019. While there, Appellant filed several pro se documents with the trial court even though he had appointed counsel. In his first letter, Appellant requested an examining trial and a personal recognizance (PR) bond until the examining trial could take place. Appellant also filed a pro se motion September 19 for a speedy trial and for discharge under article 28.061. Appellant followed the motion September 20 with another pro se letter, reasserting his requests for a speedy trial, a speedy examining trial, and a PR bond until the examining trial. On September 26, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment alleging possession, with intent to deliver, first degree felony amounts of methamphetamine and heroin; possession of a first degree felony amount of cocaine; evading arrest in a vehicle; and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On September 30, the trial court entered its pre-trial scheduling order, setting jury trial for January 23, 2020. In January, although represented by counsel, Appellant sent a pro se letter seeking a hearing on a motion for discovery and a motion for speedy trial. Proceedings were briefly paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic. By May 12, a hearing was held in which the trial court allowed Appellant to represent himself but keep standby counsel. By May 18, Appellant filed a pro se motion seeking release. This motion was ultimately denied, leading to Appellant's request for habeas relief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Appellant's speedy trial claim was not cognizable under Texas law in pretrial proceedings: "because pretrial habeas corpus litigation would not vindicate the speedy trial right and would effectively undermine that right instead. Vindication of the speedy trial right must be had through a motion to dismiss followed by appeal after trial if the motion is wrongly denied. If trial and appeal are indefinitely postponed, mandamus, not pretrial habeas, is available." View "Ex parte Sheffield" on Justia Law

Judge George Gallagher, elected judge for the 396th District Court in the Eighth Administrative Judicial Region of Texas, was specifically assigned by Presiding Judge Mary Murphy of the First Administrative Judicial Region to preside over Texas v. Paxton in the 416th District Court in the First Administrative Judicial Region in July 2015. The issue before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, on mandamus, was whether Judge Gallagher had the constitutional and statutory authority to preside over Texas v. Paxton when he granted a change of venue to Harris County in April of 2017. To this, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that he did, regardless of any other assignment orders that were issued by Presiding Judge David Evans. The Court, therefore, conditionally granted the State’s petition for writ of mandamus. View "In re Texas, ex rel. Wice" on Justia Law

Appellant Lance Taylor was convicted of murder and tampering with evidence. On appeal, he complained that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. The Court of Appeals found that it was unable to review the issue “as the trial court did not conduct a meaningful hearing.” Appellant has filed a petition for discretionary review arguing, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to conduct a de novo review. To this, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed: "The Court of Appeals misunderstood this case law to mean that some type of specially-designated 'Speedy Trial Hearing' is required before an appellate court can weigh the Barker factors. But neither this Court nor the lower courts have required that. Instead, the only requirement is that the relevant information be in the record – the length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right, and prejudice." In this case, the record showed the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and Appellant’s assertion of the right. The only thing the record might not show was whether and what type of prejudice Appellant suffered. "But that potential deficiency does not prevent an appellate court from weighing the factors; it merely affects how they will be weighed." The appellate court's judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Taylor v. Texas" on Justia Law

After Appellant Cameron Moon was certified in juvenile court to stand trial as an adult, the juvenile court ordered his case transferred to the district court for adult criminal proceedings. Appellant then filed a pretrial application of writ of habeas corpus challenging the transfer. The district court denied relief, so Appellant took an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order denying relief, concluding the State had failed to establish the necessary statutory criteria for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and transfer into the adult criminal court. As a result, the appellate court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the prosecution for lack of jurisdiction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review to consider several issues related to the juvenile court's transfer order including whether the court of appeals erred to hold that such a challenge was even cognizable in pretrial habeas. However, the Court concluded that, even if Appellant’s claims were cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding, the court of appeals lacked the authority to entertain Appellant’s interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded to that court for an order dismissing Appellant’s appeal as premature. View "Ex parte Moon" on Justia Law