Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana and sentenced to three days' confinement and a fine. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that there were no specific, articulable facts in the record to support reasonable suspicion for the stop. After its review, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals's judgment, and remanded the case so that court could determine the effect, if any, of the Supreme Court's decision in "Texas v. Mendoza" had on this case. The appellate court again reversed, and the Supreme Court granted the State review on two grounds. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's explicit language made it clear that the court found the officer's offense report credible. Therefore, the Court found the remand to the trial court for additional fact-finding was unnecessary. However, the court of appeals read the report too narrowly and disregarded reasonable inferences from the included facts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress. View "Delafuente v. Texas" on Justia Law

In November 2011, a jury convicted appellant James Garza of capital murder for his involvement in the stabbing death of the complainant for the purpose of stealing the complainant's car. The State waived the death penalty because appellant was a juvenile at the time of the murder. Immediately upon conviction, appellant was sentenced to life without parole. No sentencing hearing was conducted, and "[n]o objection was voiced to the procedure employed or to the imposition of the sentence imposed." On appeal, appellant challenged the imposition of his life-without-parole sentence arguing that, because he was a juvenile, the sentence violated his Eighth Amendment rights as defined by the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama." The Court of Appeals refused to review his claim and held that, by failing to lodge an objection in the trial court, appellant forfeited this claim on appeal. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals' decision because it conflicted with the Court's subsequently delivered opinion in "Ex parte Maxwell." View "Garza v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Cornelious Matthews was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine. He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the crack cocaine that officers found during a warrantless search of a van that appellant had borrowed. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge ruled that appellant's original detention was reasonable and that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the van. A jury then found appellant guilty and sentenced him to twenty-two years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that appellant lacked standing to challenge the van's search and upholding appellant's detention, even though it was based largely on information from an anonymous tip. The issues this case presented to the Court of Criminal Appeals was: (1) whether a person who legitimately borrows a vehicle has standing to challenge its search; and (2) if appellant's initial and continued detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. The Court concluded that, although appellant originally had standing to challenge the search of the borrowed van, he abandoned any expectation of privacy (and hence his standing) when he fled from the officers and the van. Second, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant that was not based solely on the anonymous tip, and appellant's act of fleeing increased their suspicion and further justified his continued detention to await the arrival of a drug dog. View "Matthews v. Texas" on Justia Law

The City of Plano adopted the 2003 International Property Maintenance Code (IMPC) as part of its local Property Maintenance Code. Appellee was charged by complaint with two violations of section 6-46 and the specific subsections of the IPMC for: (1) not maintaining the exterior of a structure in good repair and in a structurally sound manner; and (2) not supplying hot and cold running water to plumbing fixtures in a house. He was convicted of both counts after separate bench trials. Appellee appealed both cases to the county court at law for trial de novo and filed motions to dismiss the complaints because the State failed to allege that he was given notice that he was in violation of the code and then continued to violate the code as required under subsection 106.3. Appellee's motions were granted, and the State appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, which consolidated the two cases. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, holding that individual provisions of the code could not be taken in isolation and that, when taken as a whole, the code clearly required notice. The City filed a petition for discretionary review, arguing that the municipal code created two offenses: the one contained within the original IMPC and the one created by Plano that did not require notice. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether appellee was entitled to notice of violations of a municipal code before his subsequent violations of the code could result in convictions. Holding that he was, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the courts below. View "Texas v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Tommy and Charlie Gill were arrested for murder and held in custody for over ninety days without being formally charged. They applied for habeas relief, arguing that under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.151, they were entitled to release on a personal bond or a reduction of bail. The trial judge denied appellants' applications and the court of appeals affirmed those decisions. Because the court of appeals erred in holding that the judge properly considered factors outside of article 17.151 in denying Appellants relief under that provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the habeas court. View "Ex parte Gill" on Justia Law

Albert Turner was charged with capital murder. At trial, he was represented by Patrick McCann and Tyrone Moncriffe. Turner was found guilty and sentenced to death. The trial court appointed counsel for Turner's direct appeal and the Office of Capital Writs ("OCW") to handle Turner's postconviction writ. As part of its investigation, OCW asked Turner to authorize the release of his trial file from McCann. Turner refused to sign the release because OCW is a "state agency," and he wanted to speak with his sister before moving forward. Lacking Turner's authorization, McCann refused to release the file believing that his client was invoking his right to keep his privileged information confidential. In response, OCW filed a motion asking the trial court to order McCann to turn the file over. After a hearing, the trial court ordered trial counsel to relinquish Turner's trial file, and McCann refused. He then petitioned the Supreme Court for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition. While McCann's motion was pending, OCW withdrew as Turner's habeas counsel. Subsequently, the Supreme Court dismissed McCann's motion as moot because OCW, a "state agency," no longer represented Turner. The trial court then appointed new habeas counsel, James Rytting, to represent Turner in his postconviction application, and Rytting sought Turner's trial file for investigatory purposes. Rytting stated that he visited Turner twice in person after his appointment, and he agreed that McCann's characterization of Turner was correct in that Turner did not want the file turned over. Rytting also explained that, based on his visits with Turner, if McCann gave the file to Turner, Rytting would never see it. For his part, McCann continued to refuse to relinquish the trial file based on his understanding of his client's wishes. In a second hearing, the trial court ordered McCann to turn over his file again. After failing to comply with the trial court's second order, the court found McCann in contempt. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court conditionally granted McCann relief on his petition for writs of mandamus and dismissed his petition for a writ of prohibition. View "In re PATRICK McCANN et al." on Justia Law

Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon. The indictment also included allegations that appellant previously had been convicted of two felony offenses. After finding appellant "guilty of aggravated assault, as charged in the indictment," the jury found the enhancement paragraphs true and assessed punishment of thirty years' confinement. On direct appeal, appellant raised several claims, including a claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that the second enhancement paragraph was true: that paragraph should not have been used to enhance her punishment range because the alleged offense did not occur in the sequence alleged in the indictment. The court of appeals held that the evidence supported the enhancement of appellant's sentence under the habitual-offender statute and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the opinion of the majority of the First Court of Appeals erroneously relied on an unpublished memorandum opinion as controlling precedent rather than on a published opinion from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals that involved the same issue regarding enhanced sentences and finality of the convictions in enhancement paragraphs. Appellant suggested that the majority opinion in the court of appeals appeared to contradict the Supreme Court's subsequent adoption of the rationale of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Roberson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Leroy Coty was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 400 grams of a controlled substance. After the malfeasance of a laboratory technician that worked on his case was discovered, Applicant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted relief in a per curiam opinion. However, before mandate issued, the Court withdrew its opinion, granted rehearing, and issued a briefing order to the parties. The Court then issued a second opinion in which it set forth a new analytical framework to resolve claims of forensic technician misconduct. The Court then remanded the case to the habeas court to apply the principles laid out in that opinion. The habeas court issued new findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Court of Criminal Appeals deny relief. After reviewing the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and denied relief. View "Ex parte Coty" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether an amendment to the evading-arrest statute in the Texas Penal Code was enacted in violation of the "single-subject rule" of the Texas Constitution, thereby rendering that enactment void. Concluding that it was not, the Court determined that the court of appeals properly upheld the trial court's denial of the pre-trial application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by appellant Richard Jones. Appellant alleged that the amendment to the evading-arrest statute that became effective on September 1, 2011, was facially unconstitutional because it was enacted in violation of Section 35 of the Texas Constitution, which states, "No bill . . . shall contain more than one subject." The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that this bill did not violate the single-subject requirement. Therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Ex parte Jones" on Justia Law

The complainant was appellant's stepdaughter. In 2006, then eight years old, she told a forensic interviewer that appellant had, on one occasion, told her to sit on his face, at which point he made oral contact with her anus. The complainant also said that appellant had, on one occasion, showed her various "sex toys" and placed one between her legs so that she could "feel the vibration." Appellant responded to these accusations by providing a written statement to police that was admitted at his trial. His statement indicated that, based on prior comments by the complainant, he suspected that she had been sexually active with her brothers. He said that on one occasion, the complainant entered his bedroom, lifted her dress, and exposed herself, causing him to notice that she was not wearing underwear. Appellant stated that he decided to examine her to see if she had any physical evidence of sexual contact or injury. To examine the complainant, appellant laid her down on the bed and spread her legs while she was on her stomach. After that, he opened her buttocks to visually check her anus and labia. He determined that the "examination was inconclusive and her anus did not appear to be streached/ripped [sic]." He maintained that there was no intent for any sexual gratification. This case addresses whether a trial court's omission of a "medical care" defensive jury instruction was harmless error. The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the entire record that the jury rejected appellant's statements invoking the medical-care defense, and, therefore, he was not actually harmed in this case. Furthermore, although the court of appeals erred by referring to the sufficiency of the evidence, it reached the correct disposition.View "Cornet v. Texas" on Justia Law