Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

After legally detaining Appellant James Massey for lack of a proper registration sticker on his truck, an officer conducted an investigative pat-down search of Appellant. When Appellant forcefully resisted that search, the officer tased and handcuffed him. The officer subsequently discovered methamphetamine on the ground near where Appellant had been standing. Appellant moved to suppress the methamphetamine. In response to that motion, the trial court decided that the officer’s investigative pat-down search (a "Terry" search) was illegal. But the trial court nevertheless concluded that the taint of the illegal Terry search was attenuated by Appellant’s commission of the dual offenses of resisting search and evading detention. As a result, the trial court denied his motion. The court of appeals reversed, finding Appellant’s commission of resisting search and evading detention in response to the officer’s unlawful pat-down did not constitute “a severe departure from the common, if regrettable, range of responses” that should be expected. It therefore concluded that these offenses did not “constitute intervening circumstances” for purposes of an attenuation-of-taint analysis. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine. Accordingly, the court of appeals judgment was reversed. View "Massey v. Texas" on Justia Law

Ronald Ray, the victim in this case, was engaged in a tumultuous, on-again-off-again relationship with Appellant Robert Hart’s adult daughter, Stephanie. According to Stephanie, the relationship was one filled with violent abuse. On September 22, 2016, shortly before 1 p.m., Ray showed up unannounced in the street outside the Hart family home. Inside the home at the time were Appellant, his wife Elizabeth, Stephanie, and his other daughter. The family’s home had a security camera with a viewing monitor inside. Ray parked his vehicle across the street, got out, removed his shirt, and began smoking a cigarette. Panicked, the girls told their father that Ray was outside. In video footage, Ray was seen standing next to the open driver-side door of his car in the street. Appellant walked towards Ray while holding a gun at his side. Appellant and Ray briefly yell at one another, but it was unknown what exactly was said. Within seconds, Appellant pointed the pistol at Ray, who put his hands up and shrugged his shoulders. Appellant then almost immediately began firing at Ray, who ran towards the back of his vehicle and around to the passenger side. After pacing for a few seconds, Ray collapsed near the back of his vehicle. Appellant was ultimately convicted of murder, and he appealed, arguing his trial counsel was ineffective for declining the trial court’s offer to include a sudden-passion jury instruction in the punishment-phase charge. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined the existing direct-appeal record was inadequately developed. "Had the record contained a motion for new trial raising an ineffectiveness claim, counsel would have had an opportunity to explain why he declined the sudden-passion instruction. Such an explanation could have contained a plausible strategic reason for counsel’s decision." Therefore, based on the trial court record, the Court of Criminal Appeals could not hold that counsel’s decision to decline the sudden-passion instruction was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. The Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment granting Appellant a new punishment trial, and the case was remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Hart v. Texas" on Justia Law

When Appellee Sebastian Torres was sixteen years old, he was brought before a magistrate and read his statutory Miranda warnings. Pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 51.095(f), the magistrate requested that law enforcement officers return Appellee and the video recording of Appellee’s interview to the magistrate at the conclusion of questioning so that he could determine whether any statements Appellee gave during interrogation were voluntary. Following interrogation, the officers did not comply with the magistrate’s request. Appellee was never returned, and the magistrate never made a determination. A few months after Appellee’s interview with law enforcement, a juvenile court transferred Appellee’s case to the appropriate district court for adult criminal proceedings. Appellee filed a pretrial motion to suppress his recorded statements, arguing that since the magistrate did not ultimately make a determination whether the statements were given voluntarily, the statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress, and the State made an interlocutory appeal. The issue presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the court of appeals erred to agree with the trial court that Appellee’s statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). To answer this question, the Court first had to construe the meaning of Section 51.095(f): what does it mean for a magistrate to “use” the procedure described by Subsection (f)? The Court ultimately concluded that the magistrate did “use” the procedure, and since the magistrate did not determine whether Appellee’s statements were given voluntarily, Appellee’s statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). View "Texas v. Torres" on Justia Law

In 2016, complainant Jose Jimenez was home alone playing video games and smoking marijuana when someone knocked on the door and asked for William Benicaso. Benicaso lived at the house with Jimenez and sold marijuana. Jimenez presumed the person was there to buy drugs, so Jimenez told the person that nobody else or any marijuana was in the house. Later that night, Jimenez was still alone at the house when he heard another knock on the door. When he opened the door, he saw the end of a shotgun barrel. Jimenez tried to close the door, but four individuals forced their way inside. One of the men shot Jimenez in the head. Jimenez survived, but suffered a fractured skull with fragments permanently lodged in his brain, permanent vision loss, and lost “some gray matter,” which was found at the crime scene. Although his description of his assailant to investigators was consistent with Appellant Markerrion Allison’s appearance, Jimenez was unable to identify Appellant in a photospread lineup. Jimenez did identify two of the other individuals involved in the robbery from a photographic lineup: Sean Owens-Toombs and Trekeymian Allison (referred to as T.K.). In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Detective Reed established that he had been in law enforcement for twenty-eight years and that his career focused on counter-drug operations. Reed also undertook specialized training on criminal gangs, and became familiar with the use of certain slang terms. Reed explained that when he was unfamiliar with a particular slang term, he would ask informants or his sources what the term or word meant. The issue in this case reduced to whether Appellant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the expert testified to the meaning of a slang phrase he learned from other people. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the admission of the expert's opinion did not violate evidentiary rules or Appellant’s constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. The Court reversed the court of appeals' holding to the contrary. View "Allison v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jose Chavez was tried for capital murder based on the law of parties, but requested lesser-included offense (LIO) instructions on kidnapping and felony murder. The trial court did not submit the instructions, and Appellant was convicted. On appeal, Appellant argued the trial court should have given the instructions and that he was harmed by the trial court’s failure to give them. The court of appeals agreed and ordered a new trial. Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Appellant was not entitled to the instructions, it reversed the court of appeals' judgment and affirmed the trial court. View "Chavez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Jennifer Espinosa was found in her parked vehicle in a school pickup line at an elementary school just before school was dismissed. The engine was running, and she was asleep at the wheel. It was later discovered that she was intoxicated. Appellee told the investigating officer that she had not been drinking and was on her way to work, but told an eyewitness that she was on her way to a nearby middle school. The investigating officer arrested Appellee for DWI. Appellee filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have probable cause. The trial court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and reversed the the court of appeals, vacated the ruling of the trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Espinosa" on Justia Law

In November 2019, a jury convicted Appellant Dameon Mosley of capital murder for fatally shooting gas station employee Billy Stacks in the course of committing or attempting to commit a robbery. Based on the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, Sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial court sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant raised thirteen points of error in his automatic appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "Mosley v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Dillion Compton of capital murder. Based on the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, Sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial court sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant raised eighteen points of error in his automatic appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding each of Appellant’s points of error either meritless or not preserved, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "Compton v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Mathew Lozoya pled guilty to two counts of third-degree felony obtaining a controlled substance by fraud. Applicant pled guilty to two counts in a plea bargain; the State abandoned two. The State agreed to recommend a four-year sentence of confinement in one count and to place Applicant on community supervision for 10 years in the other. The trial court followed the agreement and ordered Applicant’s sentences to run concurrently. However, the maximum initial period of supervision for this offense, without a lawful extension, which is absent here, is five years. In year six, the prosecutor filed a motion to revoke Applicant’s community supervision. The trial court revoked the community supervision and sentenced him to five years’ incarceration. The issues this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals were: (1) whether Applicant should have been estopped from challenging the trial court’s revocation of his community supervision because he accepted benefits under his plea agreement; (2) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke Applicant’s supervision after the five-year period expired if estoppel did not apply; and (3) the proper remedy if Applicant was entitled to relief. The Court concluded Applicant was not estopped from challenging the trial court’s order revoking his community supervision, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke the supervision, and the proper remedy was to vacate the trial court’s order revoking Applicant’s community supervision. View "Ex parte Lozoya" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Ruffins was convicted by jury of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life. With respect to the testimony of an accomplice in fact, the trial court instructed the jury that it had to find an accomplice in fact to be an accomplice beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals determined that the reasonable doubt portion of the accomplice-witness application paragraph in the jury charge was erroneous, and Appellant suffered hard from that error. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the trial court record reflected Appellant specifically asked the trial court to ensure that the jury be instructed they had to agree “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the witness in question was an accomplice. The Court held that Appellant, once he stated “I’m good” with the instruction, was estopped from thereafter claiming that the instruction was improper. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court to address Appellant’s remaining points of error. View "Ruffins v. Texas" on Justia Law