Justia Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Opinion Summaries

When Appellee Sebastian Torres was sixteen years old, he was brought before a magistrate and read his statutory Miranda warnings. Pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 51.095(f), the magistrate requested that law enforcement officers return Appellee and the video recording of Appellee’s interview to the magistrate at the conclusion of questioning so that he could determine whether any statements Appellee gave during interrogation were voluntary. Following interrogation, the officers did not comply with the magistrate’s request. Appellee was never returned, and the magistrate never made a determination. A few months after Appellee’s interview with law enforcement, a juvenile court transferred Appellee’s case to the appropriate district court for adult criminal proceedings. Appellee filed a pretrial motion to suppress his recorded statements, arguing that since the magistrate did not ultimately make a determination whether the statements were given voluntarily, the statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress, and the State made an interlocutory appeal. The issue presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the court of appeals erred to agree with the trial court that Appellee’s statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). To answer this question, the Court first had to construe the meaning of Section 51.095(f): what does it mean for a magistrate to “use” the procedure described by Subsection (f)? The Court ultimately concluded that the magistrate did “use” the procedure, and since the magistrate did not determine whether Appellee’s statements were given voluntarily, Appellee’s statements were inadmissible under Section 51.095(f). View "Texas v. Torres" on Justia Law

In 2016, complainant Jose Jimenez was home alone playing video games and smoking marijuana when someone knocked on the door and asked for William Benicaso. Benicaso lived at the house with Jimenez and sold marijuana. Jimenez presumed the person was there to buy drugs, so Jimenez told the person that nobody else or any marijuana was in the house. Later that night, Jimenez was still alone at the house when he heard another knock on the door. When he opened the door, he saw the end of a shotgun barrel. Jimenez tried to close the door, but four individuals forced their way inside. One of the men shot Jimenez in the head. Jimenez survived, but suffered a fractured skull with fragments permanently lodged in his brain, permanent vision loss, and lost “some gray matter,” which was found at the crime scene. Although his description of his assailant to investigators was consistent with Appellant Markerrion Allison’s appearance, Jimenez was unable to identify Appellant in a photospread lineup. Jimenez did identify two of the other individuals involved in the robbery from a photographic lineup: Sean Owens-Toombs and Trekeymian Allison (referred to as T.K.). In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Detective Reed established that he had been in law enforcement for twenty-eight years and that his career focused on counter-drug operations. Reed also undertook specialized training on criminal gangs, and became familiar with the use of certain slang terms. Reed explained that when he was unfamiliar with a particular slang term, he would ask informants or his sources what the term or word meant. The issue in this case reduced to whether Appellant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the expert testified to the meaning of a slang phrase he learned from other people. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the admission of the expert's opinion did not violate evidentiary rules or Appellant’s constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. The Court reversed the court of appeals' holding to the contrary. View "Allison v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jose Chavez was tried for capital murder based on the law of parties, but requested lesser-included offense (LIO) instructions on kidnapping and felony murder. The trial court did not submit the instructions, and Appellant was convicted. On appeal, Appellant argued the trial court should have given the instructions and that he was harmed by the trial court’s failure to give them. The court of appeals agreed and ordered a new trial. Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded Appellant was not entitled to the instructions, it reversed the court of appeals' judgment and affirmed the trial court. View "Chavez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Jennifer Espinosa was found in her parked vehicle in a school pickup line at an elementary school just before school was dismissed. The engine was running, and she was asleep at the wheel. It was later discovered that she was intoxicated. Appellee told the investigating officer that she had not been drinking and was on her way to work, but told an eyewitness that she was on her way to a nearby middle school. The investigating officer arrested Appellee for DWI. Appellee filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have probable cause. The trial court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and reversed the the court of appeals, vacated the ruling of the trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Espinosa" on Justia Law

In November 2019, a jury convicted Appellant Dameon Mosley of capital murder for fatally shooting gas station employee Billy Stacks in the course of committing or attempting to commit a robbery. Based on the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, Sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial court sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant raised thirteen points of error in his automatic appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "Mosley v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Dillion Compton of capital murder. Based on the jury’s answers to the special issues set forth in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071, Sections 2(b) and 2(e), the trial court sentenced Appellant to death. Appellant raised eighteen points of error in his automatic appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding each of Appellant’s points of error either meritless or not preserved, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "Compton v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Mathew Lozoya pled guilty to two counts of third-degree felony obtaining a controlled substance by fraud. Applicant pled guilty to two counts in a plea bargain; the State abandoned two. The State agreed to recommend a four-year sentence of confinement in one count and to place Applicant on community supervision for 10 years in the other. The trial court followed the agreement and ordered Applicant’s sentences to run concurrently. However, the maximum initial period of supervision for this offense, without a lawful extension, which is absent here, is five years. In year six, the prosecutor filed a motion to revoke Applicant’s community supervision. The trial court revoked the community supervision and sentenced him to five years’ incarceration. The issues this case presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals were: (1) whether Applicant should have been estopped from challenging the trial court’s revocation of his community supervision because he accepted benefits under his plea agreement; (2) whether the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke Applicant’s supervision after the five-year period expired if estoppel did not apply; and (3) the proper remedy if Applicant was entitled to relief. The Court concluded Applicant was not estopped from challenging the trial court’s order revoking his community supervision, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke the supervision, and the proper remedy was to vacate the trial court’s order revoking Applicant’s community supervision. View "Ex parte Lozoya" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Ruffins was convicted by jury of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life. With respect to the testimony of an accomplice in fact, the trial court instructed the jury that it had to find an accomplice in fact to be an accomplice beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals determined that the reasonable doubt portion of the accomplice-witness application paragraph in the jury charge was erroneous, and Appellant suffered hard from that error. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the trial court record reflected Appellant specifically asked the trial court to ensure that the jury be instructed they had to agree “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the witness in question was an accomplice. The Court held that Appellant, once he stated “I’m good” with the instruction, was estopped from thereafter claiming that the instruction was improper. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that court to address Appellant’s remaining points of error. View "Ruffins v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jerel Igboji worked at a Kentucky Fried Chicken in Stafford, Texas. Shortly after the restaurant closed for the night on December 10, 2015, two armed men entered the restaurant through an unsecured back door. The men forced Appellant and his coworkers into the freezer while they took the money from the cash registers. After taking the money, the men fled, and the manager triggered the security alarm. Officers with the Stafford Police Department responded to the restaurant and began investigating the robbery that night. Officers interviewed the employees that were present during the robbery and learned the robbers entered through the back door, which Appellant had left unsecured when he took the trash out that night. Appellant cooperated with the investigation and told officers that he was asked to take the trash out by the manager, Tammi Ball. When officers spoke to Ball, however, she told them that Appellant had offered to take the trash out, which she found to be suspicious because, according to her, Appellant usually avoided work. Ball also said that Appellant took the trash out through the restaurant’s back door, which was against the restaurant’s policy. Appellant agreed to meet with a detective, who asked whether Appellant had video taken of the robbery that was posted to Snapchat. Appellant explained that Snapchat automatically deleted the videos after 24 hours and told the detective he did not have any other videos. The detective gave Appellant two options: (1) give consent to search the phone, or (2) police would seize the phone and obtain a search warrant. Appellant responded that the detective should get a search warrant, at which point Appellant’s phone was seized. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded this case back to the court of appeals to reconsider whether exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless seizure of Appellant’s cell phone, and whether the officer’s conduct in seizing the property to obtain a warrant was reasonable under those circumstances. View "Igboji v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the trial court record was void of explanation for the trial court’s decision to grant Appellant Donnell Sledge’s motion for new trial and because the language “contrary to the law and evidence,” without additional context, raised a legal sufficiency challenge. Appellant’s second trial violated double jeopardy and acquittal was the required result. Further, because Appellant was afforded more relief than he originally sought, the Court dismissed the State’s second issue regarding ineffective assistance of counsel as improvidently granted. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sledge v. Texas" on Justia Law